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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-A

ppellant,

-vsJ O S E P H MORGAN,
Defendant-Respondent.

I Case No.
v
13451

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE
The State of Utah, appellant, appeals the resentencing of respondent, Joseph Morgan, by the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT
Joseph Morgan was resentenced on August 3,1973,
to the crime of simple possession of a controlled substance with a term of six months in the Salt Lake County Jail by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the resentencing of
respondent by Judge Hanson and an affirmation of the
conviction and sentencing by Judge Sawaya for the
crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-39-4(3) which provides the state with a
right of appeal "from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state." The respondent was convicted in the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the Honorable
James S. Sawaya of being an aider and abettor of the
crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value. Respondent was tried
without a jury before Judge Sawaya. This conviction
was entered on November 30, 1972, and on December
12, 1972, respondent was sentenced by Judge Sawaya to
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term provided by law.
Subsequent to Mr. Morgan's trial, Mrs. Morgan
(the perpetrator) was charged and tried for the same
offense, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value. This was a jury trial presided over by the Honorable Ernest F . Baldwin, J r .
Mrs. Morgan was found guilty by the jury of the lesser
offense of mere possession rather than possession with
intent to distribute for value.
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Following Mrs. Morgan's conviction, the respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Third Judicial District Court which was assigned to
Judge Stewart Hanson. The petition alleged that since
Mrs. Morgan, the perpetrator of the crime, had been
subsequently convicted of a lesser offense it was improper for Mr. Morgan, the aider and abettor of the
crime, to have been convicted of a greater offense. Judge
Hanson although refusing to grant the writ of habeas
corpus heard testimony and then on his own motion decided to remand the matter to Judge Sawaya for resentencing. Judge Sawaya refused to reconsider the
matter, feeling he was correct in his original decision.
On the same day counsel for both the state and Mr.
Morgan returned to Judge Hanson who stated that in
his opinion Judge Sawaya should have resentenced respondent to a lesser charge and Judge Hanson proceeded to resentence the defendant to a six month term in
the Salt Lake County Jail for the lesser crime of simple
possession of a controlled substance. On September 12,
1973, this court upheld the original conviction of respondent by Judge Sawaya on the ground that there
was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Morgan of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, but by that time the defendant had
been resentenced and released by Judge Hanson.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
W H E R E T H E AIDER A N D ABET-
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T O R O F A C R I M E W A S T R I E D , CONVICTED AND SENTENCED PRIOR
TO T H E S E P A R A T E T R I A L O F T H E
P R I N C I P A L OF T H E CRIME, I T WAS
LEGALLY POSSIBLE AND PROPER
FOR T H E AIDER AND ABETTOR
TO B E C O N V I C T E D O F A G R E A T E R
OFFENSE THAN T H E PRINCIPAL.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-44 (1953) provides:
"All persons concerned in the commission
of a crime, either felony or misdemeanor,
whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission . . . are principals in any crime so
committed.'
Thus, in Utah there is not the traditional common law
distinction between principals of the first degree and
aiders and abettors or accessories before the fact, etc.
The authorities are abundantly clear that there need
not be an actual conviction of a principal to a crime in
order for another person to also be found guilty of that
same crime on the theory that he aided and abetted. I t
is, of course, true that there must be proof that a crime
was committed, and that there was another person involved in committing that crime, but this proof can be
made at the aider and abettor's trial by any probative,
admissible evidence. I t is not limited to proof that someone else has actually been convicted of the criminal of-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
fense itself. This principle was succinctly stated in the
case of Britto v. People, 497 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1972). I n
that case the defendant had been convicted of vehicular
assault although he was sitting in the back seat of the
automobile at the time. The Colorado Supreme Court
reversed the conviction because there had been no showing of intent as the statute required, but in doing so,
because of its particular applicability to the facts of the
case, stated a proposition which they considered to be
"elementary."
"To successfully convict a defendant of being an accessory there must be sufficient evidence presented to show that there was, in fact,
a principal who was guilty of the crime
charged. (Citation omitted.) I t is inconsequential whether or not the principal was ever
charged with a criminal offense. (Citation
omitted.)" 497 P.2d 326.
I n the case of State v. Spillman, 468 P.2d 376
(Ariz. 1970), the Arizona Supreme Court considered
a conviction for the crime of rape which was based, in
part, on a theory of aiding and abetting another in committing a forceable rape. The Arizona statute concerning aiding and abetting, A.R.S. § 13-139 is practically
identical to our section 76-1-44. The Court held as follows:
"What is required at the trial of the aider
and abettor is proof, complete and convincing,
of the guilt of the principal. Justice demands
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that the principal crime be fully proved, since
the guilt of the aider and abettor depends upon
the commission of the principal crime. Thus,
whether or not the principal is convicted or acquitted in a separate trial can have no bearing
on the trial of the aider and abettor, if the evidence shows the latter g u i l t y . . . . W e hold that
defendant's conviction under A.R.S. § 13-139
not made invalid by the fact that Gilbert Felix
was later acquitted of rape." (Emphasis added). 468 P.2d at 378.
I n State v. Slater, 476 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1970), a
burglary conviction, which was based on aiding and
abetting, was affirmed because properly admitted evidence indicated the presence of others at the scene.
R.C.W. 9.01.030 of the Washington Criminal Code defines principal, almost identically to our Section 76-1-44,
as including one who aids and abets. The Court held:
"When the state relied on proof of aiding and abetting to sustain their charge against
Slater as a principal, they were required to
prove that a crime had actually been committed, as well as the fact that Slater aided and
abetted in its commission. Evidence which
would be admissible against the principal if
tried alone may be admitted in evidence on the
trial of the aider and abettor in order to prove
the principal crime was committed. (Citation
omitted.) The prosecution of the third person
is not a prerequisite to the prosecution of the
aider and abettor." (Emphasis added). 476
R 2 d at 721.
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For similar holdings see Cody v. State, 361 P.2d
307 (Okl.Cr. 1961); People v. Simpson, 152 P.2d 339
(Calif. 1944).
The case of State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495
P.2d 808 (1972) is consistent with these holdings. I n
that case a grand larceny conviction was reversed because the court found that an instruction on aiding and
abetting was prejudicial inasmuch as "no one was proven
guilty of larcency except the defendant, and since there
was no evidence of any aiding and abetting. . . ." {Id.)
there was no suggestion that a separate individual must
first be convicted of the identical crime in a separate
proceeding but only that in the defendant's trial itself
there be proof that a crime was committed and that
someone else was also involved.
A very closely analogous situation to that presented here is covered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-40 (1953)
which provides:
"An accessory may be prosecuted, tried, and
punished, though the principal may be neither
prosecuted nor tried, though the principal may
have been acquitted."
As defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-45 (1953), an "accessory" is meant to be an "accessory after the fact."
As noted, "principal" includes aiders and abettors.
Therefore, no similar statute is required for aiders
and abettors. But clearly the policy of the State
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is not to require the successful conviction of one criminal
as a prerequisite to the conviction of another criminal.
I n the present case, there was ample evidence under
the above standards to find Mr. Morgan guilty of aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute for value. This court, has, in fact, already
ruled on this issue in that Mr. Morgan recently appealed
his initial conviction to this court alleging there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. This court
specifically held there was sufficient evidence to uphold
his conviction and affirmed Judge Sawaya's decision.
State v. Morgan,
Utah 2d
,
P.2d
, Case
Number 13218 (1974).
Thus, appellant submits that since this court has
already held there was sufficient evidence at Mr. Morgan's trial to prove that a crime had been committed
and that both Mr. Morgan and his wife assisted one
another in the commission of that crime. The fact that
in a subsequent trial before a separate judge Mr. Morgan's wife was convicted of only a lesser offense is immaterial. Mr. Morgan could have been so convicted even
though his wife had never been convicted of anything
as long as the evidence at his trial indicated his guilt.
POINT II
THE R E S E N T E N C I N G
COURT
L A C K E D J U R I S D I C T I O N TO R E SENTENCE RESPONDENT.
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While respondent's appeal was still pending before
this court, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging a new ground not raised in his brief on appeal
(that an aider and abettor of a crime cannot be convicted of a greater offense than that of his principal.)
Judge Hanson refused to treat the matter as a habeas
corpus proceeding, but heard evidence, and on his own
motion ordered the trial court to resentence Mr. Morgan. When the trial judge refused, Judge Hanson resentenced Mr. Morgan to the lesser offense of possession of a controlled substance and ordered his release.
Appellant submits it was error for the resentencing
judge to assume jurisdiction and resentence respondent
while Mr. Morgan's appeal was still pending before
the Utah Supreme Court. Such action amounts to a
lower state court serving as an intermediate appellate
court thereby depriving this court of its role to serve
as reviewing tribunal of lower state court decisions as
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-1 (1953).
Although Judge Hanson did not characterize his
action as the granting of habeas corpus relief, that was
the nature of Mr. Morgan's petition, and the results obtained by Mr. Morgan were virtually the same. Utah
is replete with case law which precludes an individual
whose appeal is still pending from petitioning a lower
state court for habeas corpus relief thereby attempting
to use habeas corpus as a substitute for appellate review.
I n Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901
(1968), this court held:
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" I t makes veritable mockery of the rules
of procedure to permit a person to ignore the
time limitations for taking procedural steps
and obtain an appellate review of a judgment
at any time he takes a notion by a habeas corpus
proceeding. The efficient and orderly administration of justice and respect for the finality
of judgments regularly arrived at demand that
the merry-go-round of litigation stop somewhere." Id. at 904.
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85,
448 P.2d 907 (1968), this court held:
"When an accused is convicted of a crime,
our law requires that any claimed error or defect be corrected by a regular appeal within the
time allowed by law, and if this is not done the
judgment becomes final. I t can then be subjected to collateral attack by an extraordinary
writ only when the interests of justice so demand because of some extraordinary circumstance or exigency: e.g., lack of jurisdiction,
mistaken identity, where the requirements of
law have been so ignored or distorted that the
accused has been deprived of 'due process of
law'
"Id. at 87.908.
Thus, in habeas corpus matters this court has clearly
held that it is improper for lower state courts to assume
the role of reviewing court by granting habeas corpus
relief where an appellate remedy before the Utah Supreme Court is or was available to the accused absent a
showing of the extraordinary circumstances expressed
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in Sullivan, supra. I n the present case, Mr. Morgan
could easily have obtained appellate review of the issue
presented by Judge Hanson simply by filing an amended brief with the Utah Supreme Court since his appeal
was still pending. Indeed, this was the only proper remedy available to respondent since reviewing jurisdiction
rested with the Utah Supreme Court. Despite this available remedy, Judge Hanson took jurisdiction of the
matter, acted as the reviewing court and resentenced
and released the respondent. Although Judge Hanson
chose to characterize his action as being something other
than the granting of habeas corpus relief, the fact remains that he acted as the reviewing tribunal thereby
depriving this Court of that function. Thus, the policy
expressed in Johnson v. Turner, supra, and Sullivan v.
Turner, supra, is equally applicable to the present situation.
Furthermore, appellant submits that the Utah Supreme Court obtained exclusive jurisdiction of the case
or controversy pursuant to the filing and perfecting of
the appeal, and until a decision on appeal was rendered,
the appellate court maintained such exclusive jurisdiction to hear all orders, injunctions, amendments to appeal, or extraordinary writs. See 4 A C.J.S. Appeal and
Error, § 606-607, wherein this position was adopted.
See also Rodriquez v. Williston, 104 Ariz. 280, 451 P.2d
609 (1969), wherein there was a showing that absent
such a jurisdiction rule, it would be possible for the
anomalous occurrence of a trial court granting a new
trial on the same day the appellate court affirms the
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judgment. Thus, the better rule of law is that the filing
and perfecting of Mr. Morgan's appeal transferred all
jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme Court during the
pendency of such appeal and any motion, amendment
or petition should have been addressed to that body by
respondent.
Finally, even if the resentencing judge's characterization of his action as a resentencing is deemed appropriate, appellant submits that the judge lacked jurisdiction to order a fellow district court judge (who had
served as trial judge) to resentence respondent. Appellant further submits that the trial judge's refusal to resentence respondent was proper and that Judge Hanson lacked jurisdiction to resentence respondent after
Judge Sawaya's refusal. District court judges have
have equal authority to serve as triers of fact at trial and
are not bound by the opinions of fellow district court
judges while acting in that capacity. The mere fact
that another district court judge disagrees with the decision of the trial judge does not authorize him to usurp
the trial judge's authority by rehearing the matter and
ordering the trial judge to resentence the accused. Judge
Sawaya would be required to resentence respondent
only if a superior state court (the Utah Supreme Court)
first determined that the initial decision was improper
and ordered the trial court to reassume jurisdiction and
resentence the accused. See State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah
68, 7 P.2d 825 (1932) and Folck v. Watson, 102 Utah
470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942). Judge Sawaya properly re-
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frained from resentencing respondent since an appeal of
the conviction was still pending before this Court and no
determination had yet been rendered by this Court as to
the validity of Judge Sawaya's decision.
I n summary, appellant submits it is the Utah Supreme Court which has the jurisdiction to order the trial
court to resentence an accused, and it is the trial court
which has the jurisdiction to perform the resentencing.
Judge Hanson lacked jurisdiction to do either.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court has
previously ruled that there was sufficient evidence to
support respondents' conviction and said conviction was
proper. To sustain the lower resentencing court's ruling
would establish an appellate procedure not forseen or
authorized by the Utah Constitution or the Rules of
Criminal Procedure governing the judiciary in the
State of Utah. Based upon the case law and Utah statutes cited, the appellant submits that Joseph Morgan's
resentencing should be set aside and the original sentence reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for

Appellant
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